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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMMIGRATION:

MEIKLEJOHN TIIEORY OF THE

FrST AMENDMENT APPLIED IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTET-Mandel

v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y.),
U.S.L.W. 3035 (U.S. July 13, 1971).

appeal docketed 40

Ernest Mandel, a noted Belgian economist and a Trotskyite Marxist, was invited to participate as a speaker and panelist in a conference
at Stanford University. He was denied a visa pursuant to two subsections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.1 Subsection
212(a)(28)(D) excludes "Aliens... who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of World communism;..."2
and subsection 212(a)(28)(G)(v) bars "Aliens who write or publish
... or who knowingly circulate ... any written or printed matter, advocating or teaching ... the economic, international and governmental
doctrines of world communism.. . . -"3 Although Mandel had been
granted visas for two previous visits to the United States, the Attorney
General on both occasions had invoked his discretionary powers to
waive the statutory disqualifications. 4 However, the Attorney General
refused to waive the statutory exclusions in order to permit this proposed third visit. Distinguished citizens of the United States who had
issued the invitation to Mandel, who were to participate in the confer-

1. Act of June 27, 1952 (Immigration and Nationality Act) §§ 212(a)(28)(D), (G)(v),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D), (G)(v) (1970).
2. Id. § 1182(a)(28)(D).
3. Id. § l182(a)(28)(G)(v).

4. Such discretion has been granted to the Attorney General by the Congress in 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1970):
Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for
a non-immigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible
for such visa under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a) of
this section (other than paragraphs (27) and (29)), may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular
officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted
such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a non-immigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General....
Pursuant to this provision, Mr. Mandel had been permitted to enter the country in 1962
and 1968. However, the Attorney General did not then inform him of the statutory disqualification or of the discretionary waiver. After the initial refusal of the Justice De-

partment to admit Mandel in 1969, the State Department recommended a third waiver
of ineligibility. The Justice Department remained adamant, however, and Mandel's

request for a visa was-denied.
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ence with him, or who merely wished to hear him speak, 5 joined with
him in bringing this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the
relevant subsections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
are unconstitutional per se and as applied, and a preliminary injunction restraining the Attorney General from enforcing those parts
of the Act. Held: The Immigration and Nationality Act, insofar as
subsection
212(a)(28)
disqualified
Mandel,
and
subsection
6
212(d)(3)(A) had been invoked to refuse him temporary admission to
the United States, constitutes a forbidden legislative intrusion upon
the sovereignty of the people and violates the first amendment rights
of United States citizens to hear the views of a communist alien.
Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed
40 U.S-.L.W. 3035 (U.S. July 13, 1971).
I.

WHAT HAVE THEY DONE TO THE REIGN?

The majority opinion of this three-judge panel dramatically restricts what was previously thought to be a generally unlimited executive prerogative in the determination of whether or not to allow aliens
to enter the United States on either a permanent or temporary basis.
Since the United States Supreme Court declared in 1950 that "an
alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any
claim of right," the "privilege" status has attached to permission to
enter the United States. 7 Moreover, although Congress has provided
legislative guidelines, the Court has nonetheless considered alien-admission decisions to be primarily within the realm of the executive. "The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The
right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation." 8 This
rigorous denial of either substantive or procedural rights to nonresi-

5. Co-plaintiffs included some of the most highly respected scholars in the United
States: David Nermelstein. Wassily Leontief, Norm n Birnbaum, Robert L. Heilbroner, Robert Paul Wolff, Louis Menashe, Noam Chomsky, and Richard A. Falk.
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(A) (1970). See note 4,supra.
7. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). For a critical survey of this dichotomy in American law see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Di.tinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
8.
Kntltff, 338 U.S. at 542.
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dent aliens not present in this country has not been significantly altered.9
The Mandel court conceded that, with respect to most aspects of
immigration affecting only the alien applicant, "an all but absolute
discretion to exclude can be vested in the executive. .".."10
However,
in this unique case, Mandel's exclusion, pursuant to specific provisions
of a Congressional act, was deemed to affect those United States citizens who invited him into the country and who anticipated participating with him and listening to him in the proposed conference. The
court found in this relationship, which it conceded to be tenuous, a
sufficient interest on the part of expectant citizens to establish their
standing to join in the suit. Although Mandel, as an alien, possesses no
affirmative and personal right to speak in this country, United States
citizens enjoy the right to hear him without improper interference by
the Government. Thus the court recognized an essential paradox of
the case:"
Mandel's status as a party does not rest on any individual right to
enter (for he has none) but exists only as against the effort to exclude
him on a ground that denies to citizens of this country their primary
rights to hear Mandel and debate with him.
The recognition of plaintiffs' standing to sue provides the court
with the opportunity to reach the merits of the case and, thus, to strike
down the relevant portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act as
unconstitutional. Asserting a new judicial role in immigration matters,
the court removed the statutory authority of the State Department to
deny entry to Mandel and rendered inconsequential the Attorney
General's refusal to waive the statutory disqualification.
II.

THE STATUTE-

INTOLERABLE INTOLERANCE

The Government relied upon subsections 212(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v)
in its refusal to admit Mandel.1 2 These subsections operate independ9. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 356 (1956); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
10. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 632 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed 40
U.S.L.W. 3035 (U.S. July 13, 1971).
11. Id. at 631-32. The standing issue is more thoroughly discussed at text accompanying notes 57-59, infra.
12. Mandel, 325 F. Supp. at 626. See text accompanying notes 2-3, supra.
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ently of the other subsections of the statute; each constitutes a separate basis for the disqualification of an alien seeking entry who has
complied with all of the other conditions of the statute.
It must be carefully noted that subsections 212(a)(28)(D) and
(G)(v) have nothing to do with subversive activities. On the contrary,
they directly and exclusively prohibit the admission of aliens who
advocate, teach, write, publish or circulate certain ideas, beliefs or
programs and aliens who are or have been affiliated with organizations which conduct or promote such behavior or thoughts. In refusing admission to Mandel, therefore, the Government pointed to no
threat and offered no justification beyond his ideas and writings. By
relying exclusively on these subsections, the Government made no attempt to connect Mandel's proposed visit and speech with potential or
forseeable incitement or other provocation to violent, unlawful or subversive acts by himself or by any member of his prospective audiences. 13 Therefore, the national security argument offered by the
Government to support its action depends upon a cerebral inference
from the ideas and writings of Mr. Mandel that he may somehow
remotely constitute a threat to the safety and well-being of the nation.
The court admitted that it appears well established that the Government has the power to prevent potential acts against the nation; it may
exclude aliens on the basis of justifiable anticipation of incitement or
other dangerous acts. "Subsection (a)(28), however, is explicit in its
direction against thhit which is specifically not active subversion but
belief and preachment." 14 Consequently, the court found that the
subsections specifically invoked by the Government conflict with the
first amendment declaration that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .15
These sweeping statutory restrictions upon thought and speech
would be clearly unconstitutional if subjected to the standards applicable to restrictions of first amendment rights directly affecting the

13. Mandel's exclusion certainly could not have been based upon his nationality, at
the time of the litigation he was a citizen of Belgium. a nation not noted for its belligerency toward the United States. Nor could his exclusion have been based upon affiliation
with a subversive organization, since it was conceded that he was not a member of the
Communist Party.
14. Mandel, 325 F. Supp. at 625.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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domestic affairs of residents of the United States. The Supreme Court,
in Brandenburg v. Ohio,1 6 declared the first amendment to withhold
from the Government the authority "to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action." 17 Since no such showing was made
in the principal case, and since the subsections on their face violate
first amendment guarantees, the Mandel court concluded that the
subsections could not be sustained, "unless their presence in an alien
18
exclusion code alters the result.
However, the court found no such justification either in the executive function of conducting foreign affairs or in the joint obligation of
the Congress and the Executive to provide for the national security. 19
After excluding these available constitutional powers as possible excuses for governmental interference with the first amendment, the
court concluded that "[t] he sole and selective effect of the statute is
to operate as a means of restraining the entry of disfavored political
doctrines and it is a forbidden enactment. '20 This surprising decision
is the result of a novel application of Alexander Meiklejohn's theory
of the first amendment, a view currently enjoying an ascendancy in
the courts and among scholars, but hitherto not applied in immigration cases.

16.
17.
18.

395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Id. at 447.
Mandel, 325 F. Supp. at 626.

19. The majority determined the "balancing" test to be inapplicable in this case.
That test is appropriate only when an otherwise legitimate governmental interest is directly and primarily pursued by the statute which only incidentally and secondarily pro-

duces governmental interference with first amendment rights. No such circumstances
existed here. Instead, the subsections invoked by the Government directly conflict with
the provisions of the first amendment. Id. at 627.

However, the dissent strongly advocated the propriety of the "balancing" test:
Since subsection (a) (28) is a limited exercise of that power amply justified by the
interest of national security and the exercise by the Legislative and Executive

branches of the Government of their foreign relations power, I conclude that its
enactment is constitutional and that any effect upon First Amendment rights of
American citizens to hear aliens (if they have such a right) is only incidental and
necessary to accomplish the purpose sought to be achieved.

Id. at 646.
20. Id. at 626.
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THE NEW VITALITY IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Alexander Meiklejohn 2 1 theorized that, in formulating a Constitutional government, the American people granted only limited powers
to the government and retained for themselves exclusive control over
the remaining elements of sovereignty. In pursuit of this objective, the
first amendment (in conjunction with the preamble, the tenth amendment and section 2 of article I) reserves to the citizenry the sovereign
power to freely communicate among themselves - at least with re-

spect to socio-political issues -

without interference by government. 2 2

This precondition to a self-critical, representative democracy withholds from government the power23 to "abridge the freedom of speech

21. Dr. Meiklejohn was the eminent professor of philosophy at the University of
Wisconsin who pioneered much of the modern scholarship concerning the first amendment. Among his seminal works are: POLItiCAi FREEDONI (1948); Freedom to Hear and
to Judge, 10 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 26 (1950); The First Amendment Is An Absolute,
1961 Sup. C I. REX,. 245: and Public Speech and the First Amendnent, 55 GEO. L. J. 234
(1966).
See also Brennan, The Supreme Court atd the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First
Amendmuent, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Tines Case: A Note
On "The Central Aleaning ofthe First Aniendent," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191: Comment.
Freedom to Hear: A PoliticalJustification of the First Amendtent, 46 WASH. L. REX.
311 (1971).
22. See Nleiklejohn. The First Amemhnent Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. REV. 245.
257:
Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of information and
opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom unabridged by our agents.
Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them. Over our governing.
they have no power. Over their governing we have sovereign power.
In reference to this analysis as adopted by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Professor Kalven commented:
This is not the whole meaning of the amendment. There are other freedoms protected by it. But at the center there is no doubt what speech is being protected and
no doubt why it is being protected. The theory of the freedom of speech clause was
put right side tip for the first time.
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendient," 1964 Sup. CL. REv. 191. 208.
23. This absence of power resembles the lack of jurisdiction which removes the
power of a court to entertain proposed litigation.
The people do not delegate all their sovereign powers. The Tenth Amendment
speaks of powers that are reserved "to the people," as well as of powers "reserved
to the States."
For the understanding of these principles it is essential to keep clear the crucial
difference between "the rights" of the governed and "the powers" of the governors.
And at this point, the title "Bill of Rights" is lamentably inaccurate as a designation
of the first ten amendments. They are not a "Bill of Rights" but a "Bill of Powers
and Rights." The Second through the Ninth Amendments limit the powers of the
subordinate agencies in order that due regard shall be paid to the private "rights of
the governed." The First and Tenth Amendments protect the governing "powers"
of the people from abridgment by the agencies which are established as their serv-
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or of the press," and is designed to protect and promote 24 unrestricted
25
discussion of public affairs.
The traditional interpretations of the first amendment have focused
upon the private rights of specific individuals; the freedom of expression thereby "embraces the prerogative of the free citizen to express
himself... .- 26 However, as Professor Thomas I. Emerson observed,
"The natural balance of forces in society today tends to be weighted
against individual expression." He concluded that "conditions in a
modem democratic society demand that a deliberate, affirmative, and
even aggressive effort be made to support the system of free expression."2 7 Meiklejohn's public interest concept of the first amendment provides that vigorous and positive influence.
The Meiklejohn approach to the first amendment was partially
adopted in New York Times v. Sullivan,28 in which the Supreme

Court greatly restricted recovery for libel when the subject of the pub-

ants. In the field of our "rights," each one of us can claim "due process of law." In
the field of our governing "powers," the notion of "due process" is irrelevant.
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 254.
24. Meiklejohn calls for,
* . . public provisions for active discussions among the members of our
self-governing society.... In every village, in every district of every town or city,
there should be established at public expense cultural centers inviting all citizens,
as they may choose, to meet together for the consideration of public policy. And
conditions must be provided under which such meetings could be happily and successfully conducted.
Id. at 260.
This suggestion may, on its face, seem to be somewhat utopian, if not simply naive,
in the context of our urbanized, mass society. However, the concept has far-reaching
implications with respect to proposed public access to broadcasting media which are
already regulated by government, ostensibly "in the public interest." See Comment,
Freedom to Hear: A Political Justification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV.
311, 330-31, 362(1971).
25. However, the freedom is not considered to be "absolute." Meiklejohn cautions
that:
It must not be assumed that every governmental regulation of a public meeting is,
under current conditions, destructive of political freedom.... [The exercise of free
expression] must conform to the necessities of the community, with respect to
time, place, circumstance, and manner of procedure.
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 261. A discussion of the difficulties raised by this otherwise absolute protection of speech is beyond the scope of this note.
26. H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 125 (1967).
27. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
955 (1963).
28. 376 U.S. 254(1964).
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lication is a public official. 29 Without specific reference to Dr. Meiklejohn, the Court entertained his premise: "Thus we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open.
...
30 The concept that the first amendment is primarily a guarantor of the public interest in unfettered discussion of
public issues and in the "free flow of information" 3 ' was even more
32
broadly accepted by the Court in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC.
Upholding two FCC equal-time orders, the Court recognized "the
fact that the 'public interest' in broadcasting clearly encompasses the
presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance
and concern to the public . . ."33 Although this observation was particularly appropriate in light of the statutory powers of the FCC to
regulate broadcasting, 34 the underlying theory of the first amendment
is explicitly connected with the Meiklejohn analysis. And the conclu35
sion of the Court is not limited to any statutory language:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ....

It is

the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or
by the FCC.
Subsequently, the open exchange of information doctrine has gained

29. In what now seems to have been a prophetic analysis of the case. Professor
Kalven said:
It is not easy to predict what the Court will see in the Times opinion as the years
roll by .... But the invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public official
to government policy to public policy to matters in the public domain, like art.
seems to me to be overwhelming. If the Court accepts the invitation, it will slowly
work out for itself the theory of free speech that Alexander Meiklejohn has been
offering us for some fifteen years now.
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 221 (footnote omitted). For a thorough discussion of subsequent limits upon libel recovery see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. Inc.. 91
S.Ct. 1811 (1971).
30. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
31. Although this phrase has not been used by the Supreme Court, it seems particularly descriptive of the objective of the Sullivan decision and its progeny.
32. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
33. Id. at 385.
34. See 45 U.S.C. § 303 (1964).
35. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
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increasing prominence in first amendment litigation.3 6 However, as is
characteristic of most innovations in constitutional interpretation, the
expansion of the "new" 37 doctrine has been cautious and gradual. 38
Its application, therefore, has been generally limited to selective first
39
amendment issues.
The Mandel court clearly adopts the Meiklejohn theory 40 and applies it to the national alien-admission policy. Since Congress is denied
the power to abridge directly and purposefully first amendment guarantees of open discussion of public affairs, the attempt to~do so in the
Immigration and Nationality Act is rendered void. The majority an41
nounces:
The prevention of the teaching and advocacy that is not incitement
or conspiracy to initiate presently programmed violence is not in any
degree a legitimate legislative objective but a forbidden one. It is for36. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965); Brooks v. Auburn University, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969);
Molpus v. Fortune, 311 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Smith v. University of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927
(N.D. Il.1968).
37. This approach to the first amendment has been traced to the formulation of the
Bill of Rights. See Mandel, 325 F. Supp. at 629; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 273-77 (1964).
38. Mr. Justice Brennan discussed this institutional inertia in an article devoted to
Dr. Meiklejohn's theory. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965). With reference to the New
York Times v. Sullivan decision, he commented:
At least one distinguished first amendment scholar, Professor Kalven of the University of Chicago Law School, senses in that opinion a departure from, if not the
discard of, the "redeeming social value," "clear and present danger," and "balancing" tests in the area of criticism of government and the official conduct of public
officials, and the adoption, not of Mr. Justice Black's "absolute" reading of the first
amendment, but of a reading in substantial agreement with that which Dr. Meiklejohn has urged. Of course, if Professor Kalven is right, this is an event of considerable importance.... But a caveat is in order. Radical shifts in judicial doctrine are
rare. They usually occur over long periods step-by-step in a series of decisions.
Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
39. Thus, the thrust of the expansion of the Meiklejohn doctrine has been in the
areas of libel (Sullivan), the rights of students at public universities to hear speakers
(Brooks, Molpts, Smith and Snyder), and the right of an individual to possess or receive
written material (Lamnont and Stanley). See cases cited note 36, stupra.
40. The court, specifically citing Meiklejohn, restates his theory in adept and explicit
language:
The First Amendment, thus, guarantees to the people as sovereign as the retained
attribute of their ultimate sovereignty, their right, in open and wide-ranging debate, publication and assembly, to review the government they have created, the
adequacy of its functioning and the presence or absence of a need to alter or displace it.
Mandel, 325 F. Supp. at 629.
41. Id. at 632.
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bidden, in ultimate analysis, because the public interest - expressed
in the First Amendment - requires that the citizens as sovereign have
access to, evaluate and accept or reject that teaching as well as every
other teaching and advocacy.
Accordingly, the Mandel decision represents an unprecedented expansion of Meiklejohn's public interest doctrine into the judicial examination of governmental regulation of immigration.
The Meiklejohn interpretation creates a new and vital dimension in
the first amendment, transforming the freedom of expression into a
uniquely positive social impulse. "The freedom that the First Amendment protects is not, then, an absence of regulation. It is the presence
of self-government." 42 This "presence of self-government" is not
merely the personal attribute of individuals who wish to speak or
write, or to listen or read. The essential nature of the first amendment
transcends such individualized interests. Far more significantly, it reserves to the people - the entire body politic - that open exchange
of information which is indispensable to the preservation of a free society. 43 This affirmative and dynamic role contrasts with the traditional interpretation of the first amendment.
Of course, the public interest aspect of the first amendment has
long been recognized by the courts. However, while the justices frequently have spoken of the "free trade of ideas" 44 as being "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," 45 and of "those liberties
of the individual which history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society," 46 these words too often
served as inspirational bunting without much legal substance. Simulta-

42. Nleiklejohn. Thie First Amendment I. An Ab.%oliue. 1961 St I,. (I. Ru'. 245.
252. This concept was paraphrased in Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 74-75: "For
speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression: it is the essence of self
government."
43. That this "'public interest" nature of the first
amendment transcends its individualized elements is clearly propounded by Nleiklejohn:
The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak." It protects the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we "'govern." It
is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.
Meiklejohn, .tpra note 42, at 255.
44. Abrams v. United States. 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919) (Holmes. J.) (dissenting
opinion).
45. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
46. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) (concurring opinion).

Immigration
neously, the effect of the unfortunate "clear and present danger" test 4 7
was to remove the protection of individualized first amendment rights
upon the showing of a relatively slight social inconvenience produced
by their self-expression. 48 Although this weakness has led to the general demise of the "clear and present danger" test, 49 the tendency of
that test to shift the public interest away from free expression and
toward the governmental interest in restricting that expression has

persistently lingered.
Traditionally, therefore, the "freedom of speech and of the press"
was used primarily in a negative context, as a restraint upon government from interfering with individual rights of expression. But this
fundamentally responsive and regulatory approach continues to produce inevitable difficulties. When viewed as merely providing personal
rights to specific individuals, the first amendment is too often susceptible to compromise under the pressure of powers affirmatively dele-

47. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.). See Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919).
For an excellent study of the change in Holmes' attitude toward his test which occurred between the Schenck decision and his dissenting opinion in Abrams see Ragen,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and the Clear and Present
Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HisT. 24 (1971).
For a survey of the use of the test in the courts, see Strong, Fifty Years of "Clearand
Present Danger":From Schenck to Brandenburg-andBeyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
48. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950). It is an example of this effortless sacrifice. Therein Chief Justice Vinson quoted approvingly the comment of Judge
Learned Hand in the opinion of the court below:
In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasions of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.
Id. at 510.
49. Many scholars have concluded that Brandenburg merely delivered the coup.de
gras to the already atrophied and discredited "clear and present danger" doctrine. Professor Emerson wrote in 1963 that, "as a general test of the limits of the first amendment, the clear and present danger test must be regarded as unacceptable." Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912 (1963). Professor Kalven thought the fall occurred before Brandenburg:"But it is clear that as of
this judgment in the Times case, it has disappeared." Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV.
191.
Whatever one believes the specific and doctrinal effect of Brandenburg to be, it
cannot be doubted that the case demonstrates that the once hallowed doctrine is no
longer of much utility, especially in the advocacy cases. See generally Linde, "Clear and
Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1163 (1970); and Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger". From
Schenck to Bradenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
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gated to the Government. The "balancing test" 50 is the classic example of this process whereby a "substantial governmental interest"5 1
is weighed against interference with the right of an individual - or of
an identifiable group - to exercise the freedom of expression. The
traditional interpretation of the first amendment subtly tends to establish the "public interest" in opposition to the first amendment guarantees.
In Meiklejohn's analysis, however, this alignment is frequently reversed, or at least substantially altered. The primary public interest
plainly rests in the vigorous exchange of information and opinion.
Since the government is thereby without power to violate this sovereignty in the absence of a pre-emptive power within the Constitution,
explicitly and justifiably shifting the "public interest" to the governmental interest, the burden upon the government to convince courts of
the constitutional propriety of its interruption of free expression is
greatly increased.
This analytical distinction produces notable effects when applied to
actual controversies. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently demonstrated the impact of the public interest interpretation of
the first amendment in Caldwell v. United States,5 2 in which a newspaper reporter was granted immunity from a federal grand jury subpoena on the grounds that his participation in the investigation would
jeopardize his relationship with his news sources. 53 In the absence of a
clear showing of a "substantial government interest" (one which might
supersede that of the open exchange of information), the Government
was not permitted to compel the attendance of Caldwell before the
grand jury. The outcome of the case did not arise from the journalist's

50. Professor Emerson defined this test:
The formula is that the court must, in each case, balance the individual and social
interest in freedom of expression against the social interest sought by the regulation
which restricts expression.
Emerson, supra note 49, at 912.
51. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
52. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
53. The fear of this "'chilling effect" was particularly justifiable since Mr. Caldwell's
news sources--members of the Black Panther organization which was the object of the
Grand Jury investigation-were extraordinarily sensitive to the possibility that he might
reveal information which had been conveyed to him in a relationship of trust and confidence. Upon the slightest indication that Caldwell had broken that trust, the sources
would no longer be available to Mr. Caldwell or to the public through the newspaper
media. Id. at 1084.
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personal privilege to refuse to respond to the subpoena. Such an argu54
ment had been frequently rejected by other courts prior to Caldwell.
Instead, the immunity arose from the public interest in the preservation of Caldwell's continued access to his news sources in order
to maintain the free flow of news in areas of public interest and
55
concern:
[W]e hold that where it has been shown that the public's First
Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a
journalist to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must respond by demonstrating a compelling need for the witness's presence before judicial process properly can issue to require
attendance.
Nor did Caldwell's claim rely upon the private interest of an identifiable audience in the "right to hear." If in fact he had argued such an
individualized right, the "public interest" might have been shifted to
support the governmental interest. This raises the possibility that the
Meiklejohn analysis must be distinguished from the right to hear. Although these two doctrines have been frequently equated,5 6 a close
examination indicates that the right to hear may be more appropriately categorized as a personal right - the corollary of the freedom
of speech - to be exercised individually. Therefore, it falls short of
the other doctrine which focuses upon the benefit which the public as
a whole derives from unfettered communication.
The Mandel court appears to have reached a similar conclusion.
Although the majority opinion repeatedly obscures the precise relationship between the two doctrines and vacillates as to whether to regard them as separate or identical, that very indecision attests to the
necessity of resolving the dilemma. The question of whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue provides the setting for the conceptual

54. See Garland v. Torre, 295 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958);
State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).

55. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (1970).
56. See Comment, Freedom to Hear: A PoliticalJustification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311, 339-40 (1972). Therein the author observes:
Clearly either the personal or the political rationale for the freedom of speech can
justify a freedom to hear.... [T] he Supreme Court has generally failed to articulate which rationale it is relying upon, or to differentiate between the two interests
which may be at stake. Specifically, the failure to isolate the political-justification
theory has foreclosed the opportunity to take advantage of broader protections
which are available once this line of analysis is identified.
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struggle. The court initially attempts to circumvent the standing issue
by declaring it to be eclipsed by the Meiklejohn analysis which invali7
dates the statute:
Since the First Amendment is not in its primary and most significant
aspect a grant by the Constitution to the citizens of individual rights of
self-expression but on the contrary reflects the total retention by the
people as sovereign to themselves of the right to free and open debate
of political questions, the issue of "standing to sue" is immediately
seen to be unreal.
Nevertheless, aware of the impropriety of ignoring the conflict, the
court ultimately attempted to reconcile the two doctrines in a particularly cogent and provocative conclusion: 58
In this case the admission of Mandel is but a lever by which the constitutional rights of his prospective citizen audience are to be given
effect; they, as the articulately concerned portion of the sovereign
people assert a very high title to support Mandel's admission.
The use of the phrase "articulately concerned portion of the sovereign
people" indicates that the lesser doctrine of right to hear is merely the
vehicle for delivery of the issue before the tribunal. However, the
statute falls not simply because certain prominent United States economists have rightfully sued for the personal privilege of hearing Mr.
Mandel. Subsections 212(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) are unconstitutional as
impermissable trespasses upon the public domain of the first amendment.
But isn't this somewhat strange? There seems to be a supreme sovereignty of the people which has been violated by the Government in
its direct assault which is void from the outset because of the lack of
sovereign power of Congress to enact the statute. Yet, in order to establish the requisite standing to sue, the court turns to the right to
hear, an affirmative and specific right held by a discrete number of
individuals endowing them with sufficient interest in the application
of the statute to challenge its validity by asserting the sovereignty of
the people. This reasoning may be self-defeating. If the primary lawthe sovereignty of the people-prohibits the zealous excesses of a

57.
58.
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government stripped of certain sovereign prerogatives, then reliance
upon the lesser "right" affirmatively assertable by individuals as a
prerequisite to the vindication of the primary public interest seems
to reduce the supremacy of the supreme.
Although the two doctrines remain undoubtedly related, 59 the distinctions evident in the majority opinion appear to compromise what
otherwise constitutes a thorough adoption of the Meiklejohn theory of
the first amendment. However, this disappointing paradox is arguably
characteristic of the "standing to sue" requirement in our legal system
which often leads to the dichotomy between general and specific injury in order to comply with the constitutional requirement of "case
and controversy."
IV.

THE OPEN END

Perhaps the enigma of Mandel is merely the product of the unique
factual and legal circumstances surrounding the case. Nevertheless, in
adopting the Meiklejohn analysis, the court provides a convincing
argument for the "public interest ' interpretation of the first amendment and reveals possible distinctions between that theory and its
cousin, the right to hear.
Although the Supreme Court recently failed to invoke the Meiklejohn theory of the first amendment when presented the opportunity in
the case of the Pentagon Papers, 6 0 it will re-encounter the issue early
this term when it hears the appeals of Mandel and Caldwell. A
glimmer of hope remains that the Court will elect to broaden its acceptance and application of Meiklejohn's analysis. If such be the case,
perhaps it will thereby provide more certainty in the relationships
among the traditional freedom of speech and of the press, the right to
hear, and the public interest doctrine of free flow of information concerning public affairs.
However, even if the Supreme Court refuses to adopt the comprehensive Meiklejohn interpretation, subsections 212(a)(28)(D) and

59. Both guarantee the availability of certain information, either to the individual
recipient or to the society at large. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965); and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (Brennan, J.) (concurring opinion).
But see United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
60. New York Times Co. v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971).
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(G)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act should be struck down,
if only as unacceptable prior restraints on free speech and press which
61
are not excused by intervening state interests.
It cannot be doubted that the temporary admission of an alien into
this country and his subsequent departure involve governmental difficulties which transcend those connected with the mere passage of
printed material through the mails.6 2 Yet the problems produced by
the presence of an active and articulate alien are mitigated by the
peculiar benefits to be derived from direct contact and conversation
between United States citizens and an advocate of alternative views on
63
public issues.
Moreover, the decision in Mandel does not open the national portals to every alien merely because the public interest may in some way
be served by his presence. The decision preserves for the government
great latitude in excluding aliens while it encourages full disclosure of
the proposed visit and of the visitor. Although it seems probable that a
bona fide subversive agent could enter this country clandestinely, an
open application for a visa by the legitimate invitee of United States
citizens serves notice upon the government and affords the opportunity to subject the alien to a thorough scrutiny. Since he would be
subject to a comprehensive border search, his potential role as a
courier would be limited to his perceptions, his memory, and his imagination. In addition, the government could reasonably require the
applicant to provide a projected itinerary, a list of sponsoring organizations,6 4 and a summary of his background and his previous activi-

61. Such reasoning was employed by the Court in the recent decision regarding the
publication of the "Pentagon Papers" by the New York Times and the Wahington Post.
Id. at 2141.
62. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
63. Nor can the difficulties arising from the visiting alien be equated with the problems produced by the responsibility of the United States government to protect its citizens in their travel abroad. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I (1965). In Zeinel the Supreme Court upheld a State Department refusal to permit United States citizens to
travel to Cuba to gather information on the social experiments there. The majority in
Mandel distinguished Zemel as a general restraint on travel arising from diplomatic
necessities and unconnected with Zemel's beliefs or publications. Neither the necessities
of foreign affairs nor the burden of governmental protection of citizens abroad justifies
Mandel's exclusion.
64. This requirement may raise some well-founded objections by United States citizens. However, a balance must somehow be struck between the necessity of the Government to regulate alien admission and the right of the people to have access to information. This requirement, if properly administered, would hopefully provide a workable
compromise.
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ties. If this information or other investigation reveals that the applicant has acted unlawfully in a previous visit to the United States, he
could be justifiably excluded. If he were to act unlawfully during his
visit, he could be deported. If he were reasonably anticipated to incite
or provoke violence, then other subsections of the Immigration and
Nationality Act provide ample power for the government to prevent
his entry. 65 These alternative methods of exclusion sufficiently protect
the national interests while they do not unduly interfere with the
public interest in the open exchange of information.
Dissenting in Mandel, Judge Bartels contended that the first
amendment should not interfere with the powers of the government to
preserve the national security or to conduct foreign affairs. However,
his perception of Mandel's admission as an interference with these
governmental powers seems to arise from a fear of the doctrines which
the applicant candidly espouses. Thus, in the opinion of Judge Bartels: 66
The loss of thousands of lives and the expenditure of billions of dollars attest to the fact that the Federal Government has reached the
judgment that the continued world-wide growth of the world Communist movement as practiced in its tyrannical form is inimical to the
best interests of this nation.
In an era marked by increased confidence in the benefits of free expression and by improved communication among nations previously
separated by mutual suspicion and hostility, Judge Bartels' justification of Mandel's exclusion seems strikingly inappropriate and unpersuasive. Certainly those lives and those billions were dedicated far less
to the prevention of those who openly advocate contrary economic
and political views from reaching our shores, than to the promotion of
those human values which this nation has long deemed to be essential
to the preservation of a free society.
65. Act of June 27, 1952 (Immigration and Nationality Act) §§ 212(a)(27), (29), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(27), (29) (1970).
66. Mandel, 325 F. Supp. at 647.
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